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An Interest Group Theory of Public Goods Provision: Reassessing the Relative Efficiency of the Market and the State

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  • Joseph Michael Newhard

    (East Tennessee State University)

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  • Joseph Michael Newhard, 2016. "An Interest Group Theory of Public Goods Provision: Reassessing the Relative Efficiency of the Market and the State," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 21-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Sandler, Todd & Hartley, Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of Nato: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1441, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. C. Lindsay & William Dougan, 2013. "Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 31-43, July.
    5. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    6. Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September.
    7. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    8. Holcombe, Randall G. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 196-207.
    9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    11. Oates, Wallace E, 1969. "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(6), pages 957-971, Nov./Dec..
    12. Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard, 1983. "Tests of a rational theory of the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 403-418, January.
    13. William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), 2001. "The Elgar Companion to Public Choice," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 459, March.
    14. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    15. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. repec:bla:kyklos:v:54:y:2001:i:2-3:p:465-72 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Robert B. Ekelund & Robert D. Tollison, 2001. "The interest-group theory of government," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January.
    19. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    20. Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne & Thomas K. Duncan, 2014. "A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 29(Spring 20), pages 51-55.
    21. Robert Higgs, 1988. "Hard Coals Make Bad Law: Congressional Parochialism versus National Defense," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 79-106, Spring/Su.
    22. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
    23. Dougan, William R & Snyder, James M, 1993. "Are Rents Fully Dissipated?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 793-813, December.
    24. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bryan P. Cutsinger, 2019. "The Durability of Legislative Benefits and the Role of the Executive Branch’s Settlement Authority," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 1-14.
    2. Michael Makovi, 2019. "Government vs. Governance: Libertarianism and Private Communities," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 39-57.

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