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Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

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  • Rachel Myrick

Abstract

Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel Myrick, 2024. "Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(4), pages 703-729, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:4:p:703-729
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231177592
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    References listed on IDEAS

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