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Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions

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  • Christopher Marcoux
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

States often create international institutions that impose legally binding rules on member states, and then do not even attempt to enforce these rules. Why? In this article, we present a game-theoretic model of moribund hard law in international institutions. We show that if some states face domestic pressure to negotiate a hard law treaty, their incentive to insist on hard law in the negotiations is maximized when less enthusiastic states expect that the hard law will probably not be enforced. Domestic proponents of hard law reward states for negotiating a hard law treaty, while states that oppose hard law can accept it because they expect no enforcement. As a form of informal governance, moribund hard law allows non-compliance by design. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 163-191, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:8:y:2013:i:2:p:163-191
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-012-9157-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    2. Christina Davis, 2015. "The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 107-117, June.
    3. Eugénia C. Heldt & Laura C. Mahrenbach, 2019. "Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 10(1), pages 19-28, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informal governance; Hard law; Soft law; Treaty design; International bargaining; Game theory; Environmental agreements; F53; F55;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements

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