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Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs

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  • Keren Yarhi-Milo
  • David T. Ribar

Abstract

It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception.

Suggested Citation

  • Keren Yarhi-Milo & David T. Ribar, 2023. "Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(4), pages 559-586, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:4:p:559-586
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027221118808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Uri Gneezy & Agne Kajackaite & Joel Sobel, 2018. "Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(2), pages 419-453, February.
    2. Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian, 2018. "Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 274-288.
    3. Sarah Maxey, 2021. "Limited Spin: When the Public Punishes Leaders Who Lie about Military Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(2-3), pages 283-312, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rachel Myrick, 2024. "Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(4), pages 703-729, April.

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