Protectionist demands in globalization
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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200006
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- Arzu Kıbrıs & Özgür Kıbrıs & Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal, 2022. "Protectionist demands in globalization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 345-365, September.
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Cited by:
- Serkan Kucuksenel & Osman Gulseven, 2020. "Electoral systems and international trade policy," Papers 2003.05725, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
Keywords
Tariff; Trade;JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
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