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Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics

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  • Cyril Hédoin

    (University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne)

Abstract

This article develops an account of political legitimacy based on the articulation of a social choice theoretic framework with the idea of public reason. I pursue two related goals. First, I characterize in detail what I call the Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics in conjunction with the idea of public reason. Second, I explore the implications of this model, when it is assumed that decision rules are among the constitutive features of the social alternatives on which individuals have preferences. The choice of the decision rule cannot be made independently of considerations regarding the likelihood that individuals will vote based on political judgments that are not publicly justified. The result is an account of political legitimacy according to which only “elitist” decision rules are amenable to public justification. Some of them are plainly compatible with liberal democracies as they currently exist. Others are however more naturally associated with the concept of epistocracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Cyril Hédoin, 2024. "Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 388-410, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-024-09437-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09437-0
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