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How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Jianzhong Wu

    (Chinese Academy of Sciences)

  • Robert Axelrod

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

Noise in the form of random errors in implementing a choice is a common problem in real-world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strategy; adding contrition to a reciprocating strategy; and using an entirely different strategy, Pavlov, based on the idea of switching choice whenever the previous payoff was low. Tournament studies, ecological simulation, and theoretical analysis demonstrate (1) a generous version of tit-for-tat is a highly effective strategy when the players it meets have not adapted to noise; (2) if the other players have adapted to noise, a contrite version of tit-for-tat is even more effective at quickly restoring mutual cooperation without the risk of exploitation; and (3) Pavlov is not robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, 1995. "How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(1), pages 183-189, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:183-189
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039001008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matus Halas, 2018. "Balancing Against Threats In Interactions Determined By Distance And Overall Gains," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(05), pages 1-22, August.
    2. Srivastava, Vatsalya, 2017. "The Sorry Clause (revision of CentER DP 2016-008)," Discussion Paper 2017-002, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. István Back & Andreas Flache, 2006. "The Viability of Cooperation Based on Interpersonal Commitment," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12.
    4. Heinrich H. Nax & Ryan O. Murphy & Stefano Duca & Dirk Helbing, 2017. "Contribution-Based Grouping under Noise," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-23, November.
    5. Irene Staveren, 2007. "Christian Economic Thought in The Netherlands," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(2), pages 127-141, January.
    6. Bernd-O. Heine & Matthias Meyer & Oliver Strangfeld, 2005. "Stylised Facts and the Contribution of Simulation to the Economic Analysis of Budgeting," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(4), pages 1-4.
    7. Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020. "Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
    8. Srivastava, Vatsalya, 2016. "The Sorry Clause," Discussion Paper 2016-004, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    9. Srivastava, Vatsalya, 2017. "The Sorry Clause (Revision of TILEC DP 2016-004)," Discussion Paper 2017-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    10. Heinrich H. Nax & Stefano Balietti & Ryan O. Murphy & Dirk Helbing, 2018. "Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 213-245, February.
    11. Murnighan, J. Keith & Wang, Long, 2016. "The social world as an experimental game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 80-94.
    12. Misato Inaba & Nobuyuki Takahashi, 2019. "Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, February.
    13. Monterosso, John & Ainslie, George & Pamela Toppi Mullen, P. A. -C. & Gault, Barbara, 2002. "The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-448, August.
    14. Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

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