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Trembles may support cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game

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  • Choi, Jung-Kyoo

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  • Choi, Jung-Kyoo, 2007. "Trembles may support cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 384-393, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:3:p:384-393
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 129-154, March.
    4. Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean, 1991. "Cooperation in the long-run," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 145-156, February.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Zhanwen & Shi, Guiping, 2009. "Cooperation in a dynamical adjustment of duopoly game with incomplete information," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 989-993.
    2. Jung-Kyoo Choi & Jun Sok Huhh, 2021. "Behavioral Mistakes Support Cooperation in an N-Person Repeated Public Goods Game," Papers 2106.15994, arXiv.org.

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