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Mutual Aid: an indirect Evolution Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • A. Capparos
  • Jean-Christophe Pereau

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Tarik Tazdait

    (CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper studies the concept of "mutual aid" developed by Kropotkin, which implies cooperation as a strategic choice. We study this concept in a Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma in a non-cooperative framework and in an indirect evolution framework (with complete and incomplete information). We systematically compare this game with one that models Kant's moral. In the non-cooperative framework both moral concepts imply multiple equilibria. In the indirect evolution framework with complete information Kropotkin's moral concept leadsto generalized cooperation, while Kant's rules lead towards general defection. In the indirect evolution framework with incomplete information both moral approaches favor selfishness. However, if some agents have an imperfect detection technology cooperative behavior will not disappear in Kropotkin's case, while it will vanish with Kant's morality.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • A. Capparos & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2010. "Mutual Aid: an indirect Evolution Analysis," Post-Print hal-00645554, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00645554
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    References listed on IDEAS

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