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Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from Uk Employment Tribunals

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  • Ioana Marinescu

Abstract

The author investigates whether judges deciding on unfair dismissal cases are sensitive to economic conditions faced by workers and firms. Using the 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain and controlling for case selection, she finds that both the unemployment and the bankruptcy rates significantly decrease the probability of judges deciding in favor of dismissed employees. A one-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a seven-point decrease in this probability; this effect, however, is not significant for unemployed workers. These findings are consistent with the idea that judges, while tailoring firing costs to economic circumstances, are somewhat more sensitive to firms' interests.

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  • Ioana Marinescu, 2011. "Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from Uk Employment Tribunals," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(4), pages 673-698, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:64:y:2011:i:4:p:673-698
    DOI: 10.1177/001979391106400403
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    1. Salzberger, Eli & Fenn, Paul, 1999. "Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 831-847, October.
    2. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jimeno Juan F. & Martínez-Matute Marta & Mora-Sanguinetti Juan S., 2020. "Employment protection legislation, labor courts, and effective firing costs," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 9(1), pages 1-26, January.
    2. Stéphane Esquerré, 2019. "Court structure and legal efficiency, the case of French échevinage in bankruptcy courts," Working Papers hal-02305492, HAL.
    3. Martín-Román, Ángel & Moral, Alfonso & Martínez-Matute, Marta, 2015. "Peer effects in judicial decisions: Evidence from Spanish labour courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 20-37.
    4. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2017. "Judicial decision making under changing legal standards: The case of dismissal arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 108-126.
    5. Miguel Á. Malo & Ángel Martín-Román & Alfonso Moral, 2018. "“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 497-525, June.
    6. Pfann, Gerard & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2015. "Dismissal Disputes and Endogenous Sorting," CEPR Discussion Papers 10684, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Pierre Bentata & Romain Espinosa & Yolande Hiriart, 2019. "Correction Activities by France’s Supreme Courts and Control over their Dockets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 169-204.
    8. Paul Latreille, 2017. "The economics of employment tribunals," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 331-331, January.
    9. Hiroko Okudaira, 2009. "The Economic Costs of Court Decisions Concerning Dismissals in Japan: Identification by Judge Transfers," ISER Discussion Paper 0733r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2015.
    10. Henri Fraisse & Francis Kramarz & Corinne Prost, 2015. "Labor Disputes and Job Flows," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 68(5), pages 1043-1077, October.
    11. Bruno Jeandidier & Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Jean-Claude Ray & Myriam Doriat-Duban, 2016. "Does Gender Matter in the Civil Law Judiciary? Evidence from French Child Support Court Decisions," Working Papers of BETA 2016-55, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    12. Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo & Bérengère Patault & Flavien Moreau, 2024. "Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(3), pages 1319-1366.
    13. Stéphane Esquerré, 2019. "How do judges judge? Evidence of local effect on French bankruptcy judgments," Working Papers hal-02291688, HAL.
    14. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2019. "Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 57-88, February.
    15. Ioana Marinescu & Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, 2021. "Wage Inequality and Labor Rights Violations," NBER Working Papers 28475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier & Jean Claude Ray, 2020. "Do sentencing guidelines result in lower inter-judge disparity? Evidence from framed field experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2020-28, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    17. Pierre Bentata & Yolande Hiriart, 2015. "Biased Judges: Evidence from French Environmental Cases," Working Papers 2015-17, CRESE.
    18. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier & Jean Ray, 2020. "Do sentencing guidelines result in lower inter-judge disparity ? Evidence from framed field experiment," Working Papers hal-02978348, HAL.
    19. Camille Signoretto & Julie Valentin, 2019. "Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 241-265, October.
    20. Per Skedinger, 2010. "Employment Protection Legislation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13686.
    21. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2017. "Economic analysis of French Labor Courts [Analyse économique des conseils de prud'hommes : Enjeux et Perspectives]," Post-Print halshs-02066317, HAL.
    22. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2020. "Judicial arbitration of unfair dismissal cases: The role of peer effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    23. Juan F. Jimeno & Marta Martínez-Matute & Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Employment protection legislation and labor court activity in Spain," Working Papers 1507, Banco de España.
    24. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier & Jean Claude Ray, 2020. "Do sentencing guidelines result in lower inter-judge disparity? Evidence from framed field experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2020-28, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    25. Okudaira, Hiroko, 2018. "The economic costs of court decisions concerning dismissals in Japan: Identification by judge transfers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 60-75.

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