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Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?

Author

Listed:
  • Camille Signoretto

    (LEST - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Sociologie du Travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEET - Centre d'études de l'emploi et du travail - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

  • Julie Valentin

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Most OECD countries divide dismissals into different types, depending on their grounds, as either disciplinary or economic. Restricted to individual dismissals, this article seeks to better understand how the differences between these two grounds with regard to statutory provisions result in the dismissal behavior of employers. Do employers choose this designation to minimize termination costs (severance payment and damages)? Using an original database of French establishments from 1999 to 2009, this article aims to analyze the factors influencing employers' use of economic and personal dismissals, providing insights into the enforcement capability of legal dismissal rules and the part played by strategic behavior. In our view, strategic behaviors should be reflected in the factors influencing both types of dismissal decisions identically, whereas compliance with legal provisions induces contrasting influences. Thus, the hypothesis tested-called the uniqueness of the model of dismissal-is the absence of specificity of the determinants, especially regarding the economic conditions of the firm and related human resource management characteristics, between the two types of dismissal. The results highlight the existence of two quite different models of dismissal even though the personal dismissal determinants are not orthogonal to the economic conditions of the firm. Economic dismissals are essentially explained by the economic conditions of firms, whereas personal dismissals are linked to the propensity of human resource management to retain employees.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Signoretto & Julie Valentin, 2019. "Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?," Post-Print halshs-02274607, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02274607
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09625-6
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02274607
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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