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Perceptual Determinants of Executive Compensation: Survey-Based Evidence from India

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  • Suveera Gill
  • Manika Kohli

Abstract

Ensuring effective and fair determination of executive compensation is complex, though equally essential for protecting the interests of shareholders and in creating long-term corporate value. The present study attempts to unravel the perceptions of executives and investors in terms of the determinants on which executive compensation ought to be based in the context of corporate India. The main research instrument is a quantitative questionnaire through which the responses of 74 top executives and 55 investors have been examined. Results highlight statistically significant mean differences in the perception of executives and investors with regards to the determinants of executive compensation. Further, the underlying dimensions representing pay determinants vary for executives and investors with the former regarding corporate governance and human capital as important, while the latter emphasising on the primacy of ownership and leverage. The article offers valuable insight as it proposes a comprehensive set of determinants of executive compensation by integrating multiple theoretical perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Suveera Gill & Manika Kohli, 2018. "Perceptual Determinants of Executive Compensation: Survey-Based Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(2), pages 159-184, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:11:y:2018:i:2:p:159-184
    DOI: 10.1177/0974686218797760
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