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Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation

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  • Cornelia Woll

    (CEE - Centre d'études européennes et de politique comparée (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelia Woll, 2013. "Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186537, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-02186537
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02314.x
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-02186537
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118590, September.
    2. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, 1997. "Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692031, April.
    3. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 425-451, October.
    4. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: The post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186320, HAL.
    2. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "Business lobbying under salience," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02187871, HAL.
    3. Kevin L Young & Timothy Marple & James Heilman & Bruce A Desmarais, 2023. "A double-edged sword: The conditional properties of elite network ties in the financial sector," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 55(4), pages 997-1019, June.
    4. Lucia Quaglia & Aneta Spendzharova, 2023. "Explaining the EU’s Uneven Influence Across the International Regime Complex in Shadow Banking," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(2), pages 6-16.
    5. Scott James & Lucia Quaglia, 2023. "Epistemic contestation and interagency conflict: The challenge of regulating investment funds," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 346-362, April.
    6. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "From Outsiders to Insiders: A Civil Society Perspective on EU Financial Reforms," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02184200, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Lobbying; Economic interests;

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