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Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

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  • Adam W. Chalmers

Abstract

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam W. Chalmers, 2020. "Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 391-408, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:14:y:2020:i:3:p:391-408
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Idunn Nørbech, 2024. "Does policy context matter for citizen engagement in policymaking? Evidence from the European Commission's public consultation regime," European Union Politics, , vol. 25(1), pages 130-150, March.

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