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A Dynamic Framework of Noneconomic Goals and Inter-Family Agency Complexities in Multi-Family Firms

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  • James J. Chrisman
  • Kristen Madison
  • Taewoo Kim

Abstract

Multi-family firms represent an important and complex type of family firm that is not as well understood as single-family firms. We develop a governance-based framework of the agency complexities in multi-family firms, theorizing that divergent family-centered noneconomic goals between the owning families create complex inter-family agency problems that are intensified by evolving family dynamics. We propose governance mechanisms that address these problems by limiting opportunistic behavior associated with the pursuit of noneconomic goals related to firm control, family altruism, social capital, and transgenerational succession. We then present a future research agenda that can expand our knowledge of multi-family firms.

Suggested Citation

  • James J. Chrisman & Kristen Madison & Taewoo Kim, 2021. "A Dynamic Framework of Noneconomic Goals and Inter-Family Agency Complexities in Multi-Family Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 45(4), pages 906-930, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:entthe:v:45:y:2021:i:4:p:906-930
    DOI: 10.1177/10422587211005775
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    2. Markin, Erik T. & Skorodziyevskiy, Vitaliy & Zhu, Lina & Chrisman, James J. & Fang, Hanqing “Chevy”, 2022. "Lone-founder firms in China: Replicating Miller et al. (2007) in a different context," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4).
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