IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ecoind/v44y2023i4p1197-1221.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effects of public goods framing for a union default policy

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Harcourt

    (University of Waikato, New Zealand)

  • Gregor Gall

    (University of Leeds, UK)

  • Margaret Wilson

    (University of Waikato, New Zealand)

Abstract

Union provision of collective bargaining and political lobbying generates positive outcomes across society. A union default holds significant promise to revive the flagging fortunes of unions by enabling them to recruit many more members, extend their bargaining coverage, and place them in a stronger position to deliver these positive outcomes. Non-unionism is the default setting in employment arrangements. A union default would reverse this, so employees are defaulted into membership in the first instance, but with a right to opt-out. In this article the authors test whether framing unions as providers of public goods increases worker support for a union default and intention to stay in a union, if defaulted. The authors find that workers are significantly more likely to support a union default and stay in union membership in scenarios involving positive framing for unions.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Harcourt & Gregor Gall & Margaret Wilson, 2023. "The effects of public goods framing for a union default policy," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 44(4), pages 1197-1221, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:44:y:2023:i:4:p:1197-1221
    DOI: 10.1177/0143831X221120526
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0143831X221120526
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0143831X221120526?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Tannenbaum & Craig R. Fox & Todd Rogers, 2017. "On the misplaced politics of behavioural policy interventions," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 1(7), pages 1-7, July.
    2. David Card & Thomas Lemieux & W. Craig Riddell, 2020. "Unions and wage inequality: The roles of gender, skill and public sector employment," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 140-173, February.
    3. Metcalf, David & Hansen, Kirstine & Charlwood, Andy, 2001. "Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 176, pages 61-75, April.
    4. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
    5. Mark Harcourt & Gregor Gall & Nisha Novell & Margaret Wilson, 2021. "Boosting Union Membership: Reconciling Liberal and Social Democratic Conceptions of Freedom of Association via a Union Default," Industrial Law Journal, Industrial Law Society, vol. 50(3), pages 375-404.
    6. David Card, 2001. "The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(2), pages 296-315, January.
    7. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter, 2010. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 541-556, March.
    8. repec:cup:judgdm:v:11:y:2016:i:4:p:310-325 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Alex Bryson & Michael White, 2016. "Unions and the economic basis of attitudes," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 360-378, July.
    10. Jack Fiorito & Irene Padavic, 2022. "What Do Workers and the Public Want? Unions’ Social Value," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(2), pages 295-320, March.
    11. David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson & Colin Green, 2022. "Trade unions and the well‐being of workers," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 60(2), pages 255-277, June.
    12. Huang, Qianqian & Jiang, Feng & Lie, Erik & Que, Tingting, 2017. "The Effect of Labor Unions on CEO Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 553-582, April.
    13. VanHeuvelen, Tom & Brady, David, 2022. "Labor Unions and American Poverty," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 75(4), pages 891-917.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mark Harcourt & Gregor Gall & Margaret Wilson, 2024. "The union default: Free‐riding solutions," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 267-284, July.
    2. Mark Harcourt & Gregor Gall & Margaret Wilson, 2023. "The union default: Effects and implications of regulated opting‐out," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 132-149, March.
    3. Diederich, Johannes & Goeschl, Timo & Waichman, Israel, 2023. "Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging," Working Papers 0726, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    4. Kohei Nitta, 2014. "The Effect of Income Heterogeneity in An Experiment with Global and Local Public Goods," Working Papers 201403, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    5. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher, 2013. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 225-246, April.
    6. Lohse, Johannes & Goeschl, Timo & Diederich , Johannes, 2014. "Giving is a question of time: Response times and contributions to a real world public good," Working Papers 0566, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    7. Elena Cettolin & Arno Riedl, 2011. "Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3556, CESifo.
    8. Andreas Löschel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "On the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 195-204, April.
    9. Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 500-512.
    10. Martin G. Kocher & Fangfang Tan & Jing Yu, 2018. "Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation And Cooperation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 381-397, January.
    11. Baker, Michael & Halberstam, Yosh & Kroft, Kory & Mas, Alexandre & Messacar, Derek, 2024. "The impact of unions on wages in the public sector: Evidence from higher education," CLEF Working Paper Series 67, Canadian Labour Economics Forum (CLEF), University of Waterloo.
    12. Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation," Papers 2311.02813, arXiv.org.
    13. Sun-Ki Chai & Dolgorsuren Dorj & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2018. "Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experimental Economics and Culture, volume 20, pages 89-166, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    14. Devesh Rustagi, 2023. "Market Exposure, Civic Values, and Rules," Discussion Papers 2023-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    15. Falk, Armin & Menrath, Ingo & Verde, Pablo Emilio & Siegrist, Johannes, 2011. "Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay," IZA Discussion Papers 5720, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Andrej Angelovski & Tibor Neugebauer & Maroš Servatka, 2019. "Can Rank-Order Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers CESARE 1705, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    17. Francesco Fallucchi & R. Andrew Luccasen & Theodore L. Turocy, 2017. "Behavioural types in public goods games: A re-analysis by hierarchical clutering," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    18. Fosgaard, Toke R. & Hansen, Lars G. & Wengström, Erik, 2019. "Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 416-427.
    19. Markussen, Thomas & Sharma, Smriti & Singhal, Saurabh & Tarp, Finn, 2021. "Inequality, institutions and cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    20. Bluffstone, Randy & Dannenberg, Astrid & Martinsson, Peter & Jha, Prakash & Bista, Rajesh, 2020. "Cooperative behavior and common pool resources: Experimental evidence from community forest user groups in Nepal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:44:y:2023:i:4:p:1197-1221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.ekhist.uu.se/english.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.