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La RSE comme instrument de gouvernance d’entreprise : une application à l’industrie française des télécommunications

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  • Cézanne, Cécile
  • Rubinstein, Marianne

Abstract

Associant les travaux sur la « nouvelle firme » (Zingales, 2000) aux inflexions récentes de la responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise (RSE), cet article montre que les entreprises utilisent désormais la RSE comme instrument de gouvernance d’entreprise. Cette conception instrumentale de la RSE est corroborée par une étude empirique de l’industrie française des télécommunications. L’étude des documents officiels et d’entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès des responsables de la RSE chez les opérateurs français de téléphonie atteste que la RSE est utilisée pour mettre en œuvre des dispositifs formels et informels de gouvernance d’entreprise, complémentaires de ceux du modèle actionnarial, dans une logique de pérennisation des relations d’emploi et de sous-traitance créatrices de valeur ajoutée.

Suggested Citation

  • Cézanne, Cécile & Rubinstein, Marianne, 2012. "La RSE comme instrument de gouvernance d’entreprise : une application à l’industrie française des télécommunications," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.
    • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2012:9819
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital humain; frontières de la firme; gouvernance d’entreprise; responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise; industrie française des télécommunications; human capital; boundaries of the firm; corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; French industry of telecommunications; capital humano; fronteras de la firma; gobernanza de la empresa; responsabilidad social de la empresa; industria francesa de telecomunicaciones;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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