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Who Is in Charge? A Property Rights Perspective on Stakeholder Governance

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  • Klein, Peter G.

    (University of MO)

  • Mahoney, Joseph T.

    (University of IL)

  • McGahan, Anita M.

    (University of Toronto and Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard University)

  • Pitelis, Christos N.

    (University of Cambridge)

Abstract

Debates on "shareholder" and "stakeholder" approaches to corporate governance often get bogged down in competing normative claims about economic rent streams, entitlements of different group members, fairness, and similar distributional issues. These concerns are important, but core economic issues in shareholder-stakeholder debates revolve around the positive analysis of property rights, transaction costs, ownership, and control. Going beyond the stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics, which assume away co-investment by the firm's transactional and contractual partners, we show how theories of implicit and explicit contracting help us understand better joint investments and the creation of joint value. We call on scholars of Strategic Organization to embrace more robust theories of the firm and interfirm relations that take seriously the complex web of investments and residual claims that characterize team production and co-created value.

Suggested Citation

  • Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2012. "Who Is in Charge? A Property Rights Perspective on Stakeholder Governance," Working Papers 12-0102, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:12-0102
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    9. Christos Pitelis, 2013. "Towards a More ‘Ethically Correct’ Governance for Economic Sustainability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 655-665, December.
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    11. Maria Goranova & Lori Verstegen Ryan, 2022. "The Corporate Objective Revisited: The Shareholder Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 526-554, March.
    12. J. W. Stoelhorst, 2023. "Value, rent, and profit: A stakeholder resource‐based theory," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(6), pages 1488-1513, June.
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    14. Misani, Nicola, 2020. "Sustainability and Implicit Contracts," MPRA Paper 104963, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Serres, Coline & Hudon, Marek & Maon, François, 2022. "Social corporations under the spotlight: A governance perspective," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 37(3).
    16. Shaikh, Ibrahim & Randhawa, Krithika, 2022. "Managing the risks and motivations of technology managers in open innovation: Bringing stakeholder-centric corporate governance into focus," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    17. Ciaran Driver & Maria João Coelho Guedes, 2017. "R&D and CEO departure date: do financial incentives make CEOs more opportunistic?," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 26(5), pages 801-820.
    18. Sinziana Dorobantu & Kate Odziemkowska, 2017. "Valuing Stakeholder Governance: Property Rights, Community Mobilization, and Firm Value," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(13), pages 2682-2703, December.
    19. Najda-Janoszka, Marta, 2020. "Value capture dynamics – opportunity-driven changes," MPRA Paper 105290, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Conti, Raffaele & Novelli, Elena, 2022. "Not all technologies are created equal for stakeholders: Constituency statutes, firm stakeholder orientation and investments in technology generality," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(3).
    21. Caleb Bernacchio, 2023. "Business and the Ethics of Recognition," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 1-16, June.
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    23. Mircea Epure, 2022. "Corporate social responsibility as a signaling technology," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 907-930, April.

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