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Peer norm guesses and self-reported attitudes towards performance-related pay

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  • Nikolaos Georgantzis
  • Efi Vasileiou
  • Iordanis Kotzaivazoglou

Abstract

Due to a variety of reasons, people see themselves differently from how they see others. This basic asymmetry has broad consequences. It leads people to judge themselves and their own behavior differently from how they judge others and others’ behavior. This research, first, studies the perceptions and attitudes of Greek Public Sector employees towards the introduction of Performance-Related Pay (PRP) systems trying to reveal whether there is a divergence between individual attitudes and guesses on peers’ attitudes. Secondly, it is investigated whether divergence between own self-reported and peer norm guesses could mediate the acceptance of the aforementioned implementation once job status has been controlled for. This study uses a unique questionnaire of 520 observations which was designed to address the questions outlined in the preceding lines. Our econometric results indicate that workers have heterogeneous attitudes and hold heterogeneous beliefs on others’ expectations regarding a successful implementation of PRP. Specifically, individual perceptions are less skeptical towards PRP than are beliefs on others’ attitudes. Additionally, we found that managers are significantly more optimistic than lower rank employees regarding the expected success of PRP systems in their jobs. However, they both expect their peers to be more negative than they themselves are.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaos Georgantzis & Efi Vasileiou & Iordanis Kotzaivazoglou, 2017. "Peer norm guesses and self-reported attitudes towards performance-related pay," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(4), pages 1-15, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0174724
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0174724
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    References listed on IDEAS

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