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Promising High Monetary Rewards for Future Task Performance Increases Intermediate Task Performance

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  • Claire M Zedelius
  • Harm Veling
  • Erik Bijleveld
  • Henk Aarts

Abstract

In everyday life contexts and work settings, monetary rewards are often contingent on future performance. Based on research showing that the anticipation of rewards causes improved task performance through enhanced task preparation, the present study tested the hypothesis that the promise of monetary rewards for future performance would not only increase future performance, but also performance on an unrewarded intermediate task. Participants performed an auditory Simon task in which they responded to two consecutive tones. While participants could earn high vs. low monetary rewards for fast responses to every second tone, their responses to the first tone were not rewarded. Moreover, we compared performance under conditions in which reward information could prompt strategic performance adjustments (i.e., when reward information was presented for a relatively long duration) to conditions preventing strategic performance adjustments (i.e., when reward information was presented very briefly). Results showed that high (vs. low) rewards sped up both rewarded and intermediate, unrewarded responses, and the effect was independent of the duration of reward presentation. Moreover, long presentation led to a speed-accuracy trade-off for both rewarded and unrewarded tones, whereas short presentation sped up responses to rewarded and unrewarded tones without this trade-off. These results suggest that high rewards for future performance boost intermediate performance due to enhanced task preparation, and they do so regardless whether people respond to rewards in a strategic or non-strategic manner.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire M Zedelius & Harm Veling & Erik Bijleveld & Henk Aarts, 2012. "Promising High Monetary Rewards for Future Task Performance Increases Intermediate Task Performance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(8), pages 1-8, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0042547
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0042547
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    Cited by:

    1. Liuting Diao & Cody Ding & Senqing Qi & Qinghong Zeng & Bo Huang & Mengsi Xu & Lingxia Fan & Dong Yang, 2014. "Influence of Supraliminal Reward Information on Unconsciously Triggered Response Inhibition," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(9), pages 1-6, September.
    2. Andrew Pendleton & Ben Lupton & Andrew Rowe & Richard Whittle, 2019. "Back to the Shop Floor: Behavioural Insights from Workplace Sociology," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 33(6), pages 1039-1057, December.
    3. Ahmet O Ceceli & Catherine E Myers & Elizabeth Tricomi, 2020. "Demonstrating and disrupting well-learned habits," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(6), pages 1-28, June.

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