Choose, rate or squeeze: Comparison of economic value functions elicited by different behavioral tasks

A standard view in neuroeconomics is that to make a choice, an agent first assigns subjective values to available options, and then compares them to select the best. In choice tasks, these cardinal values are typically inferred from the preference expressed by subjects between options presented in pairs. Alternatively, cardinal values can be directly elicited by asking subjects to place a cursor on an analog scale (rating task) or to exert a force on a power grip (effort task). These tasks can vary in many respects: they can notably be more or less costly and consequential. Here, we compared the value functions elicited by choice, rating and effort tasks on options composed of two monetary amounts: one for the subject (gain) and one for a charity (donation). Bayesian model selection showed that despite important differences between the three tasks, they all elicited a same value function, with similar weighting of gain and donation, but variable concavity. Moreover, value functions elicited by the different tasks could predict choices with equivalent accuracy. Our finding therefore suggests that comparable value functions can account for various motivated behaviors, beyond economic choice. Nevertheless, we report slight differences in the computational efficiency of parameter estimation that may guide the design of future studies.Author summary: In economic decision theory, value is a construct that provides a metric to compare options: agents are likely to select options leading to high-value outcomes. In neuroscience, different behavioral tasks have been used to elicit the subjective values of potential outcomes, notably rating tasks, which demand an explicit value judgment on the outcome, and effort tasks, which demand an energetic expense (in order to increase outcome probability). However, it remains unclear whether the values elicited by these tasks are the same as the values that drive choices. Indeed, it has been argued that they involve different costs and consequences for the agent. Here, we compared value models that could account for behavioral responses in choice, rating and effort tasks involving the same set of options, which combined a monetary gain for the participant and a donation to a charity. We found that the most plausible model was that a same value function, with a similar selfishness parameter (relative weight on gain and donation), generated the responses in all three tasks. This finding strengthens the notion of value as a general explanation of motivated behaviors, beyond standard economic choice.