IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/ijodag/v21y2024i2d10.1057_s41310-023-00188-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEO compensation and market risk: moderating effect of board size and CEO duality in the Swiss context

Author

Listed:
  • Mehtap A. Eklund

    (University of Wisconsin La Crosse (UWL))

Abstract

This paper aims to find an answer to the questions of “whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are compensated for market risk”, and “how the combined interaction of board size and CEO duality moderates this relationship” from the tenets of agency theory and managerial power theory. Even though the contracting view of agency theory posits that agents are neither to be punished nor rewarded for events that go beyond their direct control (market risk), the research findings in the corporate governance domain are contradictory. It was found that Chinese and American executives were paid for market risk, including oil prices and exchange rates, which was explained by retention risk and weaker corporate governance systems. To shed light on previous inconclusive research, this paper investigates the topic further in a new country setting, that of Switzerland, because the previous results were mostly related to Anglo-Saxon countries. Switzerland is also one of the exemplary countries for executive compensation. Furthermore, it investigates the combined (cascaded) interaction effects of the board size and CEO duality on CEO compensation and market risk from the perspective of managerial power theory, which has not been previously analyzed in the literature to date. For the direct effect, in contrast to previous findings in Anglo-Saxon countries, it has been found that CEOs were not paid for market risk in Switzerland, which confirms agency theory’s contracting prediction. This finding outlines the future comparative research area in this domain. For the combined interaction effect, it has been found that board size incorporated with CEO duality is the significant cascaded moderator, and large boards with CEO duality are significantly more effective in controlling asymmetric compensation, which confirms the efficacy of large boards with CEO duality in coping with asymmetric compensation and managerial entrenchment (managerial power theory). These results have both practical and academic implications for boards of directors, Human Resources and corporate governance literature, agency theory, and managerial power theory, by providing further evidence on previous inconclusive findings on board size, CEO duality, and the role of market risk in the CEO pay structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehtap A. Eklund, 2024. "CEO compensation and market risk: moderating effect of board size and CEO duality in the Swiss context," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(2), pages 227-240, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:21:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1057_s41310-023-00188-2
    DOI: 10.1057/s41310-023-00188-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41310-023-00188-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41310-023-00188-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, 2009. "CEO Compensation and Board Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 231-261, February.
    2. Keller, Wolfgang & Olney, William W., 2021. "Globalization and executive compensation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    3. Petre BREZEANU & Mohammed Subhi Al ESSAWI & Dorina POANTA & Leonardo BADEA, 2011. "Does Corporate Governance Impact Risk Management System?," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(4(557)), pages 49-64, April.
    4. Dan Lin & Hsien-Chang Kuo & Lei-Huey Wang, 2013. "Chief Executive Compensation: An Empirical Study of Fat Cat CEOs," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 7(2), pages 27-42.
    5. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
    6. Setia-Atmaja, Lukas & Haman, Janto & Tanewski, George, 2011. "The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 230-246.
    7. Schmid, Stefan & Altfeld, Frederic & Dauth, Tobias, 2018. "Americanization as a driver of CEO pay in Europe: The moderating role of CEO power," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 433-451.
    8. Campbell, T. Colin & Thompson, Mary Elizabeth, 2015. "Why are CEOs paid for good luck? An empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 247-264.
    9. Raviv, Alon & Sisli-Ciamarra, Elif, 2013. "Executive compensation, risk taking and the state of the economy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 55-68.
    10. Bell, R. Greg & Moore, Curt B. & Filatotchev, Igor, 2012. "Strategic and institutional effects on foreign IPO performance: Examining the impact of country of origin, corporate governance, and host country effects," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 197-216.
    11. Melanie Cao & Rong Wang, 2013. "Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(5), pages 2001-2058, October.
    12. repec:eme:ijlma0:17542431211281963 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Albuquerque, Ana, 2009. "Peer firms in relative performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 69-89, October.
    14. Göx, Robert F. & Hemmer, Thomas, 2020. "On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).
    15. Santanu K. Ganguli & Soumya Guha Deb, 2021. "Board composition, ownership structure and firm performance: New Indian evidence," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 18(3), pages 256-268, September.
    16. Jed DeVaro & Jin‐Hyuk Kim & Nick Vikander, 2018. "Non‐performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(613), pages 1923-1951, August.
    17. Timothy B. Palmer & Robert M. Wiseman, 1999. "Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: a holistic model of risk," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(11), pages 1037-1062, November.
    18. Vassiliki Grougiou & Stergios Leventis & Emmanouil Dedoulis & Stephen Owusu-Ansah, 2014. "Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks," Accounting Forum, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 155-169, September.
    19. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df, 1987. "An Analysis Of The Use Of Accounting And Market Measures Of Performance In Executive-Compensation Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25, pages 85-129.
    20. Huang, Ying Sophie & Wang, Chia-Jane, 2015. "Corporate governance and risk-taking of Chinese firms: The role of board size," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 96-113.
    21. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    22. Naveen D Daniel & Yuanzhi Li & Lalitha Naveen & Francesca Cornelli, 2020. "Symmetry in Pay for Luck," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(7), pages 3174-3204.
    23. Teodora Paligorova, 2008. "The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck," Staff Working Papers 08-20, Bank of Canada.
    24. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
    25. Grougiou, Vassiliki & Leventis, Stergios & Dedoulis, Emmanouil & Owusu-Ansah, Stephen, 2014. "Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 155-169.
    26. Anam Tasawar & Mian Sajid Nazir, 2019. "The nexus between effective corporate monitoring and CEO compensation," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 10(1), pages 81-94.
    27. Samuel Buertey & Eun‐Jung Sun & Jang Soon Lee & Juhee Hwang, 2020. "Corporate social responsibility and earnings management: The moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 256-271, January.
    28. Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 291-309, November.
    29. Garvey, Gerald T. & Milbourn, Todd T., 2006. "Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 197-225, October.
    30. Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
    31. Theodore Syriopoulos & Michael Tsatsaronis, 2012. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Financial Performance: CEO Duality in Shipping Firms," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 2(1), pages 1-30, June.
    32. Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2008. "Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 152-168, November.
    33. Ozkan, Neslihan, 2007. "Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 349-364, December.
    34. Yim, Soojin, 2013. "The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 250-273.
    35. Khan, Raihan & Dharwadkar, Ravi & Brandes, Pamela, 2005. "Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(8), pages 1078-1088, August.
    36. Patrick L. McClelland & Jonathan P. O'Brien, 2011. "Transaction cost economics and corporate governance: the case of CEO age and financial stake," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(3), pages 141-158, April.
    37. Ing-Haw Cheng & Harrison Hong & José A. Scheinkman, 2015. "Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(2), pages 839-879, April.
    38. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Managerial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1068-1077, September.
    39. Brian K. Boyd, 1994. "Board control and ceo compensation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 335-344, June.
    40. Shang, Xiaodan & Luo, Chuanjian & Wen, Qian, 2020. "Do Chinese executives reward for luck?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 318-325.
    41. Jerry Goodstein & Kanak Gautam & Warren Boeker, 1994. "The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 241-250, March.
    42. Gerald J. Lobo & Michael Neel & Adrienne Rhodes, 2018. "Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 1137-1176, September.
    43. Mario Krenn, 2015. "The role of codetermination in shareholder oriented corporate governance reform: the case of executive remuneration disclosure," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(2/3/4), pages 178-193.
    44. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Introduction to the special issue on managerial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1065-1067, September.
    45. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    46. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    47. Chourou, Lamia & Abaoub, Ezzeddine & Saadi, Samir, 2008. "The economic determinants of CEO stock option compensation," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 61-77, February.
    48. Jeffrey Harrison & Joseph Coombs, 2012. "The Moderating Effects from Corporate Governance Characteristics on the Relationship Between Available Slack and Community-Based Firm Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 107(4), pages 409-422, June.
    49. Ayman Haddad & Wasim AlShattarat & Naser AbuGhazaleh & Haitham Nobanee, 2015. "The impact of ownership structure and family board domination on voluntary disclosure for Jordanian listed companies," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 203-234, December.
    50. Amzaleg, Yaron & Azar, Ofer H. & Ben-Zion, Uri & Rosenfeld, Ahron, 2014. "CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 166-174.
    51. Nguyen, Pascal, 2011. "Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 278-297, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Reza, Syed Walid, 2020. "Profit skimming, asymmetric benchmarking, or the effects of implicit incentives? Evidence from natural disasters," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 57.
    2. Martijn Cremers & Yaniv Grinstein, 2009. "The Market for CEO Talent: Implications for CEO Compensation," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2385, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
    3. Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(6), pages 157-180, November.
    4. Brookman, Jeffrey T. & Thistle, Paul D., 2013. "Managerial compensation: Luck, skill or labor markets?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 252-268.
    5. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    6. Michelle L. Zorn & Christine Shropshire & John A. Martin & James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen Jr., 2017. "Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(13), pages 2623-2646, December.
    7. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
    8. Balafas, Nikolaos & Florackis, Chris, 2014. "CEO compensation and future shareholder returns: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 97-115.
    9. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
    10. Na, Ke, 2020. "CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 679-700.
    11. Dirk E. Black & Ervin L. Black & Theodore E. Christensen & Kurt H. Gee, 2022. "Comparing Non-GAAP EPS in Earnings Announcements and Proxy Statements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1353-1377, February.
    12. Ahmed, Shaker & Ranta, Mikko & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2023. "Facial attractiveness and CEO compensation: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    13. Crespí-Cladera, Rafel & Pascual-Fuster, Bartolomé, 2014. "Does the independence of independent directors matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 116-134.
    14. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
    15. Richard Heaney & Vineet Tawani & John Goodwin, 2010. "Australian CEO Remuneration," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(2), pages 109-127, June.
    16. Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh & Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah & Saeed Akbar, 2018. "Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(18), pages 2012-2027, April.
    17. Amore, Mario Daniele & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2020. "The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 14839, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    19. Jed DeVaro & Jin-Hyuk Kim & Nick Vikander, 2014. "Pay-for-(Persistent)-Luck: CEO Bonuses Under Relational and Formal Contracting," Discussion Papers 14-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    20. Tor‐Erik Bakke & Hamed Mahmudi & Ashley Newton, 2020. "Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 997-1027, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO compensation; Asymmetric compensation; Market risk; Corporate governance; Agency theory; Managerial power theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:21:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1057_s41310-023-00188-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.