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The price of reputation: Executive compensation of sin companies

Author

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  • Sheng‐Syan Chen
  • Carl Hsin‐han Shen
  • Yanzhi Wang

Abstract

This study examines how and why managers receive pay premiums when vulnerable to social reputation loss. We define sin companies as those operating in the alcohol, gambling and tobacco industries. We show that company managers receive a higher asymmetric pay‐for‐performance sensitivity in their pay in addition to receiving higher total compensation. In other words, their pay increases with firm performance at a faster rate than that of their non‐sin company peers. This finding is consistent with our prediction that sin companies provide greater rewards to their managers upon satisfactory performance, generating a pay premium. We propose two explanations for the reputation pay premium associated with sin‐industry managers: the limited future career opportunities and the difficulty of reconciling managers’ self‐identity with the employer's social identity. We find stronger support for the latter explanation. The sin‐industry pay premium is larger when managers have pro‐social and religious tendencies. However, we do not find a smaller pay premium when managers are close to their retirement. Since the career concern should be reduced for managers who are near retirement, this finding is inconsistent with the career opportunity explanation. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that managers associate their self‐image with employers’ social identities.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheng‐Syan Chen & Carl Hsin‐han Shen & Yanzhi Wang, 2023. "The price of reputation: Executive compensation of sin companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(9-10), pages 2021-2050, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:50:y:2023:i:9-10:p:2021-2050
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12684
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