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Managerial compensation: Luck, skill or labor markets?

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  • Brookman, Jeffrey T.
  • Thistle, Paul D.

Abstract

Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Brookman, Jeffrey T. & Thistle, Paul D., 2013. "Managerial compensation: Luck, skill or labor markets?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 252-268.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:21:y:2013:i:c:p:252-268
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.03.001
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    Cited by:

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    2. Victor Esteban Jarosiewicz & David Gaddis Ross, 2023. "Revisiting managerial “style”: The replicability and falsifiability of manager fixed effects for firm policies," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 858-886, March.
    3. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Smith, Alexander & Spraggon, John, 2017. "Reward the lucky? An experimental investigation of the impact of agency and luck on bonuses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 87-97.
    5. James, Hui Liang & Ngo, Thanh & Wang, Hongxia, 2023. "The impact of more able managers on corporate trade credit," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    6. James, Hui L. & Benson, Bradley W. & Park, Jung Chul, 2020. "CEO fixed effects and inside debt compensation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 71-86.
    7. Campbell, T. Colin & Thompson, Mary Elizabeth, 2015. "Why are CEOs paid for good luck? An empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 247-264.
    8. Egor Evdokimov & Dean Hanlon & Edwin KiaYang Lim, 2022. "Do Generalist CEOs Magnify Boardroom Backscratching?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 221-247, November.
    9. Sunday OGBEIDE & Babatunde AKANJI, 2016. "Executive Remuneration and the Financial Performance of Quoted Firms: The Nigerian Experience," Management and Economics Review, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 1(2), pages 229-242, December.
    10. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olufemi Bodunde Obembe & Emmanuel Oluwole Oni, 2017. "Analysis of the Nexus between CEO Pay and Performance of Non-Financial Listed Firms in Nigeria," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 29(3), pages 429-445, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive compensation; Human capital; Managerial ability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics

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