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Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets: The Role of External Discipline

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  • Xavier Vives

Abstract

This article reviews the main issues of regulating and supervising banks in emerging markets with a view toward evaluating the long-run options. Particular attention is paid to Latin America and East Asia. These economies face a severe policy commitment problem that leads to excessive bailouts and potential devaluation of claims of foreign investors. This exacerbates moral hazard and makes a case for importing external discipline (for example, acquiring foreign short-term debt). However, external discipline may come at the cost of excessive liquidation of entrepreneurial projects. The article reviews the tradeoffs imposed by external discipline and examines various proposed arrangements, such as narrow banking, foreign banks and foreign regulation, and the potential role for an international agency or international lender of last resort. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Vives, 2006. "Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets: The Role of External Discipline," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 179-206.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:21:y:2006:i:2:p:179-206
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    7. Bourgain, Arnaud & Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2012. "Financial openness, disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 283-300.
    8. Chung-Hua Shen & Yu-Li Huang, 2013. "Effects of earnings management on bank cost of debt," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(1), pages 265-300, March.
    9. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.
    10. Altin Turhani & Hysen Hoda, 2016. "The Impact of Interest Rate on Bank Deposit: Evidence from the Albanian Banking Sector (Jan 2005 – Dec 2014)," Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Richtmann Publishing Ltd, vol. 5, July.
    11. Huang, Yu-Li & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2015. "Cross-country variations in capital structure adjustment—The role of credit ratings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 277-294.
    12. Mohammad Joarder & Monir Ahmed & Tahsina Haque & Syed Hasanuzzaman, 2014. "An empirical testing of informational efficiency in Bangladesh capital market," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 63-87, February.
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