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On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort

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  • Stanley Fischer

Abstract

Is there a useful function for an international lender of last resort (ILLR)--defined as crisis lender and crisis manager? Yes for international capital flows are excessively volatile and contagious, and because an ILLR can help mitigate the effects of this instability. I examine the Bagehot rules, and their applicability in an international context, focusing on the problem of moral hazard. I argue that a critical condition for the successful operation of an ILLR, a role that is to an important extent played by the IMF, is to ensure private sector involvement in the resolution of emerging market financial crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:4:p:85-104
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.4.85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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