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Foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture

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  • Jeanne, Olivier

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  • Jeanne, Olivier, 2000. "Foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 719-727, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:719-727
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
    2. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    3. Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. Valdes, 1999. "Liquidity crises and the international financial architecture," Textos para discussão 401, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    4. Bohn, Henning, 1990. "A positive theory of foreign currency debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3-4), pages 273-292, November.
    5. Barry J. Eichengreen, 1999. "Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 51, April.
    6. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 1-51, March.
    7. E Falcetti & S Milner, 1999. "The Currency Denomination of Public Debt and the Choice of the Monetary Regime," CEP Discussion Papers dp0427, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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