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Impacts of Adjusting Environmental Regulations When Enforcement Authority Is Diffuse: Confined Animal Feeding Operations and Environmental Quality

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  • Jeffrey D. Mullen
  • Terrence J. Centner

Abstract

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recently adjusted regulations governing confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), significantly increasing the number of regulated firms. A theoretical model is developed to analyze how changes to the number of regulated firms, monitoring effort, and compliance standards affect environmental quality. The model suggests increasing the number of regulated firms, ceteris paribus, has an ambiguous effect on environmental quality, and may actually reduce it. The impact of increasing compliance standards depends on how violations are prosecuted and sanctions are set. Greater monitoring effort increases environmental quality. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey D. Mullen & Terrence J. Centner, 2004. "Impacts of Adjusting Environmental Regulations When Enforcement Authority Is Diffuse: Confined Animal Feeding Operations and Environmental Quality," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 209-219.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revage:v:26:y:2004:i:2:p:209-219
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9353.2004.00171.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Letson & Noel Gollehon & Catherine Kascak & Vincent Breneman & Carlyle Mose, 1998. "Confined Animal Production and Groundwater Protection," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 348-364.
    2. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
    3. Parker, Doug, 2000. "Controlling agricultural nonpoint water pollution: costs of implementing the Maryland Water Quality Improvement Act of 1998," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 23-31, December.
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    2. Haixiao Huang & Gay Y. Miller, 2006. "Citizen Complaints, Regulatory Violations, and Their Implications for Swine Operations in Illinois," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 89-110.

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