Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9321-2
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Cited by:
- Dietrich Earnhart & Sarah Jacobson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Richard T. Woodward, 2023.
"Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill,"
Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 203-221.
- Earnhart, Dietrich & Jacobson, Sarah & Kuwayama, Yusuke & Woodward, Richard T., 2019. "Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill," RFF Working Paper Series 19-20, Resources for the Future.
- Dietrich Earnhart & Sarah Jacobson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Richard T. Woodward, 2020. "Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-04, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Dietrich Earnhart & Sarah Jacobson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Richard T. Woodward, 2019. "Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-11, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Herzing, Mathias, 2021. "Multiple equilibria in the context of inspection probabilities depending on firms’ relative emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Arguedas, Carmen & Cabo, Francisco & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2020. "Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Effluent limits; Monitoring; Inspections; Environmental permits; Wastewater; Compliance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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