Analysis Of The Signaling Hypothesis In Higher Education Marketing Via Classroom Experiment
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More about this item
Keywords
signaling; information asymmetry; higher education marketing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
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