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Early Sales of Bordeaux grands crus

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  • Mahenc, Philippe
  • Meunier, Valérie

Abstract

En primeur sales of Bordeaux grands crus occur every spring on the Bordeaux marketplace and represent the main source of supply for wine merchants. We address two specific issues related to the en primeur strategy. First, we study whether en primeur prices are good estimates of wines' qualities, as well as how they may reveal any relevant information to uninformed buyers. Second, we consider which roles en primeur sales may play between traders, given the market informational and competitive structures. (JEL classification: D42, D82, L15.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mahenc, Philippe & Meunier, Valérie, 2006. "Early Sales of Bordeaux grands crus," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 57-74, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jwecon:v:1:y:2006:i:01:p:57-74_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance, 1997. "The Use of Quality and Reputation Indicators by Consumers: The Case of Bordeaux Wine," MPRA Paper 9283, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Céline, 2010. "Identifying the effect of unobserved quality and expert reviews in the pricing of experience goods: Empirical application on Bordeaux wine," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 205-212, May.
    2. Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Marcin Czupryna, 2021. "On the Extension of the Kiyotaki and Wright model to Transformable Goods," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 989-1014, April.
    3. Schnabel Hubert & Storchmann Karl, 2010. "Prices as Quality Signals: Evidence from the Wine Market," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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