Signaling to Experts
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- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2021. "Signalling to Experts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 800-850.
- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," NBER Working Papers 23817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Scheuer, Florian & Kurlat, Pablo, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2017. "Signaling to Experts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6655, CESifo.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021.
"Signaling versus Auditing,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018. "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7183, CESifo.
- Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 286, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Tobias Dieler & Sonny Biswas & Giacomo Calzolari & Fabio Castiglionesi, 2023. "Asset Trade, Real Investment, and a Tilting Financial Transaction Tax," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2401-2424, April.
- Dosis, Anastasios, 2018.
"On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
- Anastasios Dosis, 2018. "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print hal-02980534, HAL.
- Ursprung, Heinrich, 2019.
"Endogenous maternity allowances as exemplified by academic promotion standards,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-11.
- Heinrich Ursprung, 2019. "Endogenous Maternity Allowances as Exemplified by Academic Promotion Standards," CESifo Working Paper Series 7490, CESifo.
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022.
"Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2018. "Bad news turned good: reversal under censorship," ECON - Working Papers 307, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Dieler, Tobias & Biswas, Sonny & Calzolari, Giacomo & Castiglionesi, Fabio, 2023. "Asset trade, real investment and a tilting financial transaction tax," Other publications TiSEM d936387a-90f0-481a-a75b-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Chen, Yu & Doyle, Matthew & Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2024. "Wages as signals of worker mobility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2016-09-04 (Education)
- NEP-MIC-2016-09-04 (Microeconomics)
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