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Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War

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  • Debs, Alexandre
  • Monteiro, Nuno P.

Abstract

Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power shifts as a fait accompli. Knowing this, their adversaries may strike preventively even without conclusive evidence of militarization. In fact, the more effective preventive wars are, the more likely they will be launched against states that are not militarizing. Our argument emphasizes the role of imperfect information as a cause of war. It also explains why powerful states may attack weaker targets even with ambiguous evidence of their militarization. We illustrate our theory through an account of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

Suggested Citation

  • Debs, Alexandre & Monteiro, Nuno P., 2014. "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 1-31, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:68:y:2014:i:01:p:1-31_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
    2. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    3. Ma, Siyu & Biran, Dov, 2023. "Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 472-483.
    4. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2024. "Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," SocArXiv 7bp4n, Center for Open Science.
    5. Anne Meng, 2019. "Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 568-599, October.
    6. Jo Jakobsen & Thomas Halvorsen, 2019. "Geographical and temporal patterns of interstate security competition: Global and regional evidence," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 226-246, September.
    7. Abbink, Klaus & Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2023. "Preventive wars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 552-569.
      • Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Preventive Wars," Discussion Papers 2022-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    8. Matthew Nanes, 2020. "Police integration and support for anti-government violence in divided societies: Evidence from Iraq," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(2), pages 329-343, March.
    9. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    10. Nakao Keisuke, 2020. "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(4), pages 1-20, December.
    11. Michael Gibilisco, 2023. "Mowing the grass," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 204-231, July.
    12. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017. "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 177-189.
    13. George W Williford & Douglas B Atkinson, 2020. "A Bayesian forecasting model of international conflict," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 17(3), pages 235-242, July.
    14. David R. Mandel & Daniel Irwin, 2021. "Facilitating sender-receiver agreement in communicated probabilities: Is it best to use words, numbers or both?," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(2), pages 363-393, March.
    15. Tommy Andersson & Conan Mukherjee, 2021. "Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 253-270, April.
    16. Bradley C. Smith & William Spaniel, 2020. "Introducing ν-CLEAR: a latent variable approach to measuring nuclear proficiency," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(2), pages 232-256, March.
    17. Kyle Haynes & Brandon K. Yoder, 2024. "Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 26-46, January.
    18. Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2022. "A Theory of Power Wars," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-30, January.
    19. Matthew Fuhrmann & Benjamin Tkach, 2015. "Almost nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(4), pages 443-461, September.
    20. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:2:p:363-393 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. William Spaniel, 2022. "Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 447-469, July.

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