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Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Battiston, Giacomo
  • Bizzarri, Matteo
  • Franceschin, Riccardo

Abstract

Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Battiston, Giacomo & Bizzarri, Matteo & Franceschin, Riccardo, 2025. "Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:86:y:2025:i:c:s017626802400137x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Resource curse; Third party; Oil; Intervention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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