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Do parties matter in delegation? Partisan preferences and the creation of regulatory agencies in Europe

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  • Laurenz Ennser‐Jedenastik

Abstract

The ideological orientation of parties in government has not been prominently featured in explaining the rise of regulatory agencies. This paper argues that theories based on political uncertainty and credible commitment can yield meaningful predictions regarding the relationship between government preferences and the establishment of regulatory agencies, when ideological orientation is linked with notions of party competence and issue ownership. The empirical section tests three such hypotheses with data on the establishment of 110 regulatory agencies in 20 European democracies between 1980 and 2009, thus providing one of the most comprehensive cross‐national analyses of agency creation to date. The results show that ideologically extreme cabinets are more likely to establish regulatory agencies and that right‐wing governments create more agencies in the economic than in the social domain. These findings partly qualify the view on the scarce relevance of government preferences in explaining the rise of the agency model in regulation and that the emulation mechanism of the diffusion process is the dominant force behind agencification.

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  • Laurenz Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2016. "Do parties matter in delegation? Partisan preferences and the creation of regulatory agencies in Europe," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 193-210, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:3:p:193-210
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12072
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