IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksa/szemle/1717.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A köztisztviselői törvények hatása a kormányzati kiadásokra
[The effects of civil-service legislation on government spending]

Author

Listed:
  • Ujhelyi, Gergely

Abstract

Fontos-e, hogy a bürokrácia független legyen a politikától? Milyen hatással járnak azok a törvények, amelyek a politikusok és a bürokrácia kapcsolatát szorosabbá teszik vagy lazítják? Ezek alapvető kérdések a modern államok szervezésével kapcsolatban, mégis viszonylag keveset tudunk róluk. Ebben a cikkben a témakör egy szeletével foglalkozom: a köztisztviselői törvények hatásaival. Összefoglalok néhány közelmúltbeli elméleti és empirikus eredményt, és rövid áttekintést nyújtok az idevágó közgazdasági és politikatudományi irodalomról.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D72, D73, E62, H11, H72.

Suggested Citation

  • Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2017. "A köztisztviselői törvények hatása a kormányzati kiadásokra [The effects of civil-service legislation on government spending]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 885-914.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1717
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2017.9.885
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=1717
    Download Restriction: Registration and subscription. 3-month embargo period to non-subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18414/KSZ.2017.9.885?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    2. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 338-380, May.
    3. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    5. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2011. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 82-112, August.
    6. Dilyan Donchev & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "What Do Corruption Indices Measure?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 309-331, July.
    7. Ting, Michael M., 2012. "Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 367-385, May.
    8. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2014. "Civil service reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 15-25.
    9. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    10. Sorauf, Frank J., 1956. "State Patronage in a Rural County," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 1046-1056, December.
    11. Canice Prendergast, 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 180-196, March.
    12. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
    13. Rauch, James E, 1995. "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities during the Progressive Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 968-979, September.
    14. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    15. Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
    16. George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2006. "Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 770-787, July.
    17. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    18. Judson, Ruth A. & Owen, Ann L., 1999. "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-15, October.
    19. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    20. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June.
    21. Clare Leaver, 2009. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 572-607, June.
    22. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Newey, Whitney & Rosen, Harvey S, 1988. "Estimating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1371-1395, November.
    23. Vlaicu, Razvan & Whalley, Alexander, 2016. "Hierarchical accountability in government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 85-99.
    24. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 873-889, October.
    25. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    26. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2006. "Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 530-550, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bostashvili, David & Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2019. "Political budget cycles and the civil service: Evidence from highway spending in US states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 17-28.
    2. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 338-380, May.
    3. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2014. "Civil service reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 15-25.
    4. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2014. "Civil service reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 15-25.
    5. Daniel Gibbs, 2020. "Civil service reform, self‐selection, and bureaucratic performance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 279-304, July.
    6. Atsuyoshi Morozumi & Francisco Jose Veiga & Linda Goncalves Veiga, 2014. "Electoral effects on the composition of public spending and revenue: evidence from a large panel of countries," Discussion Papers 2014/16, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
    7. Ash, Elliott & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2021. "Reducing partisanship in judicial elections can improve judge quality: Evidence from U.S. state supreme courts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    8. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2017. "Client Service and the Growth of Government," Working Papers 1704, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    9. Hanusch, Marek & Keefer, Philip, 2014. "Younger parties, bigger spenders? Party age and political budget cycles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1-18.
    10. Valsecchi, Michele, 2016. "Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability," Working Papers in Economics 684, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    11. Petrarca, Ilaria, 2014. "No news is costly news: The link between the diffusion of the press and public spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 68-85.
    12. Drometer, Marcus & Méango, Romuald, 2015. "Electoral cycles, partisan effects and U.S. immigration policies," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113052, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Jörg L. Spenkuch & Edoardo Teso & Guo Xu, 2023. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1171-1203, July.
    14. Jeroen Klomp, 2020. "Subsidizing power," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(3), pages 300-321, July.
    15. Ruben Enikolopov, 2011. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Working Papers w0165, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    16. Aidt, Toke S. & Mooney, Graham, 2014. "Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902–1937," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 53-71.
    17. Israel Garcia & Bernd Hayo, 2022. "The Influence of Politicians’ Sex on Political Budget Cycles: An Empirical Analysis of Spanish Municipalities," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202223, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    18. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2019. "Civil service and the growth of government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 1-1.
    19. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2018. "The Electoral Dynamics of Human Development," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(1), pages 191-211, January.
    20. Lee, Dongwon & Min, Sujin, 2021. "Defective democracy and the political budget cycle," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 947-961.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1717. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Odon Sok (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kszemle.hu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.