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Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States

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  • George A. Krause
  • David E. Lewis
  • James W. Douglas

Abstract

Scholarship on executive politics provides conflicting views about whether staffing administrative agencies through politicized or (politically) autonomous means is the best method for maximizing bureaucratic competence. We offer a theoretical account which maintains that obtaining a proper balance between both types of personnel systems across the supervisory and subordinate levels of an organization will best foster bureaucratic competence. We evaluate our organizational balancing thesis using data on executive branch general revenue fund forecasts in the American states from 1987 to 2002. States with a combination of politically appointed agency executives and merit‐selected subordinates generally provide more accurate revenue forecasts than states that possess uniformly politicized personnel selection systems. Conversely, states with a combination of department head–appointed executives and subordinates chosen from an at‐will system (i.e., nonmerit) produce more accurate forecasts than states with uniformly autonomous personnel selection systems. Our statistical findings underscore the positive consequences associated with balancing politicized and autonomous means of selecting personnel within hierarchies of political organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2006. "Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 770-787, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:3:p:770-787
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00215.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Buettner & Bjoern Kauder, 2015. "Political biases despite external expert participation? An empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 287-307, September.
    2. Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2022. "Electoral cycles in macroeconomic forecasts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 307-340.
    3. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Christoph Schinke, 2017. "Manipulating Fiscal Forecasts: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 73(2), pages 213-236, June.
    4. Michael M Ting & James M Snyder Jr & Shigeo Hirano & Olle Folke, 2013. "Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 363-387, July.
    5. Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana, 2017. "Who's Getting the Office? Autocracy And Elected Politicians' Career Path: Evidence from the Mexican States," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    6. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 338-380, May.
    7. Bostashvili, David & Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2019. "Political budget cycles and the civil service: Evidence from highway spending in US states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 17-28.
    8. Sameen A. Mohsin Ali, 2022. "Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(2), pages 733-753, April.
    9. Tarald Gulseth Berge & Øyvind Stiansen, 2023. "Bureaucratic capacity and preference attainment in international economic negotiations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 467-498, July.
    10. Hang Duong, 2021. "The politicization of civil service recruitment and promotion in Vietnam," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 51-62, May.
    11. Thiess Buettner & Bjoern Kauder, 2010. "Revenue Forecasting Practices: Differences across Countries and Consequences for Forecasting Performance," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 313-340, September.
    12. Michael M. Ting, 2017. "Politics and Administration," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 305-319, April.
    13. Richard Boylan, 2008. "Political distortions in state forecasts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 411-427, September.
    14. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2017. "A köztisztviselői törvények hatása a kormányzati kiadásokra [The effects of civil-service legislation on government spending]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 885-914.
    15. Don S. Lee, 2020. "Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(1), pages 82-101, January.
    16. George A. Krause & David E. Lewis & James W. Douglas, 2013. "Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 271-295, March.

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