IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v74y2013i4p479-507.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Communication compatible voting rules

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Thordal-Le Quement

Abstract

We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a sufficient condition, based on a simple measure of preference misalignment, under which the set of voting rules compatible with full pooling is at most a singleton. As a caveat to any simplistic conclusions, we identify a case in which an increase in heterogeneity (i.e. polarization) systematically generates the possibility of full pooling. Increased jury size, in contrast, is shown to always render full pooling more difficult. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2013. "Communication compatible voting rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 479-507, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:4:p:479-507
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9329-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-012-9329-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-012-9329-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372.
    2. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
    4. Van Weelden, Richard, 2008. "Deliberation Rules and Voting," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(1), pages 83-88, January.
    5. Austen-Smith, David & Feddersen, Timothy J., 2006. "Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 209-217, May.
    6. Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
    7. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    2. Deimen, Inga & Ketelaar, Felix & Le Quement, Mark T., 2015. "Consistency and communication in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 24-35.
    3. Mark T. Le Quement & Isabel Marcin, 2016. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.
    4. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    5. Frommeyer, Tim, 2015. "On Two-Period Committee Voting: Why Straw Polls Should Have Consequences," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112806, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    2. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
    4. Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
    5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    6. Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009. "Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
    7. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Mark T. Le Quement & Isabel Marcin, 2016. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.
    9. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    10. Yingni Guo, 2021. "Information transmission and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 835-868, October.
    11. Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.
    12. Mark Quement & Venuga Yokeeswaran, 2015. "Subgroup deliberation and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 155-186, June.
    13. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2009. "Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/20, European University Institute.
    14. Deimen, Inga & Ketelaar, Felix & Le Quement, Mark T., 2015. "Consistency and communication in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 24-35.
    15. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
    16. Catonini, Emiliano & Kurbatov, Andrey & Stepanov, Sergey, 2024. "Independent versus collective expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 340-356.
    17. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    18. Javier Rivas & Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2017. "Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(4), pages 395-429, July.
    19. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    20. Ban, Radu & Jha, Saumitra & Rao, Vijayendra, 2012. "Who has voice in a deliberative democracy? Evidence from transcripts of village parliaments in south India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 428-438.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committees; Communication; Strategic voting; C72; D71; D72; D74; D82; D83;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:4:p:479-507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.