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Subgroup deliberation and voting

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  • Mark Quement
  • Venuga Yokeeswaran

Abstract

We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Quement & Venuga Yokeeswaran, 2015. "Subgroup deliberation and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 155-186, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:155-186
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0871-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
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    3. Gerardi, Dino, 2000. "Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 395-406, June.
    4. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
    5. Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
    6. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
    7. Adam Meirowitz, 2002. "Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 219-236.
    8. Van Weelden, Richard, 2008. "Deliberation Rules and Voting," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(1), pages 83-88, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    2. Kira Pronin & Jonathan Woon, 2023. "Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 625-645, May.
    3. Javier Rivas & Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2017. "Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(4), pages 395-429, July.
    4. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    5. Deimen, Inga & Ketelaar, Felix & Le Quement, Mark T., 2015. "Consistency and communication in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 24-35.
    6. Mark T. Le Quement & Isabel Marcin, 2016. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C72; D71; D72; D74; D82; D83;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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