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Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior

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  • Andrew Keeler

Abstract

Economic models of enforcing environmental law have incorporated varying assumptions about regulatory objectives. This paper examines the consequences of different attitudes toward the benefits and costs of pollution control on the part of regulators who have limited powers and resources. We find that greater weight given to compliance costs relative to the social damages of the polluting activity will bring outcomes closer to the optimum when the regulator is strong, but may move outcome further from the social optimum when regulatory powers are weak. When negotiated noncompliance is an option, greater consideration of compliance costs will tend to produce better results. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:6:y:1995:i:1:p:73-85
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00691412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1990. "Regulatory Compliance with Nonlinear Penalties," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 99-103, March.
    2. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
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    10. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
    11. Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
    12. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    2. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A note on the complementarity of uniform emission standards and monitoring strategies," Working Papers 2009/12, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    3. Carmen Arguedas & Dietrich Earnhart & Sandra Rousseau, 2017. "Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 159-183, April.
    4. Carmen Arguedas & Francisco Cabo & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2017. "Optimal Pollution Standards and Non-compliance in a Dynamic Framework," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 537-567, November.
    5. Arguedas, Carmen & Cabo, Francisco & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2020. "Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    6. Christopher S. Decker, 2006. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: An Inter-industry Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 47-66, Winter.
    7. Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487, September.
    8. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    9. William S. Neilson & Geum Soo Kim, 2001. "A Standard‐Setting Agency and Environmental Enforcement," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(3), pages 757-763, January.

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