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Communication skills and competition for donors

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  • Gersbach, Hans

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  • Gersbach, Hans, 1998. "Communication skills and competition for donors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-18, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:3-18
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    1. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 329-346, Springer.
    2. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    3. Bernhardt, M. Daniel & Ingerman, Daniel E., 1985. "Candidate reputations and the `incumbency effect'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-67, June.
    4. Stephen P. Magee & William A. Brock, 1983. "A Model of Politics, Tariffs and Rent-seeking in General Equilibrium," International Economic Association Series, in: Burton Weisbrod & Helen Hughes (ed.), Human Resources, Employment and Development, chapter 31, pages 497-523, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Anderson, Simon P & Glomm, Gerhard, 1992. "Incumbency Effects in Political Campaigns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 207-219, September.
    6. Roger D. Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 297-311, Springer.
    7. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 226-239, April.
    8. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    9. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    10. Peter Bernholz, 1977. "Dominant Interest Groups And Powerless Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 411-420, August.
    11. Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, March.
    12. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
    13. Gersbach, Hans, 1992. "Allocation of information by majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 259-268, July.
    14. Roger Congleton, 1989. "Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 101-118, August.
    15. Glazer, Amihai, 1990. "The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 237-241, March.
    16. Enelow, James M. & Hinich, Melvin J., 1982. "Ideology, Issues, and the Spatial Theory of Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 493-501, September.
    17. Larry Samuelson, 1987. "A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 141-169, January.
    18. Clark, Derek & Thomas, Jonathan, 1995. "Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 254-259, March.
    19. repec:bla:kyklos:v:30:y:1977:i:3:p:411-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. David P. Baron, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72.
    21. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Campaigns, political mobility, and communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
    2. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Government Debt-Threshold Contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 444-458, January.
    3. Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
    4. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Characterization of multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension," MPRA Paper 14513, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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