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Legal Conflicts of Interest of the Revolving Door

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  • Elise S. Brezis

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the conflicts of interest arising from the “revolving door”. The revolving door is a common phenomenon, and it is unlikely that most of it can be explained by ‘regulatory capture’, a practice that is unlawful. Therefore, there is a need for a new framework.
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Suggested Citation

  • Elise S. Brezis, 2017. "Legal Conflicts of Interest of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2017-05, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2017-05
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    Cited by:

    1. Elise S. Brezis, 2022. "Jewish Law and Ethics: The Case of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2022-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elites; bureaucracy; conflicts of interest; bureaucratic capital; revolving door; economic growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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