Legal Conflicts of Interest of the Revolving Door
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- Brezis, Elise S., 2017. "Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 175-188.
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Cited by:
- Elise S. Brezis, 2022. "Jewish Law and Ethics: The Case of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2022-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Elites; bureaucracy; conflicts of interest; bureaucratic capital; revolving door; economic growth;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
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