Regulator performance, regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Richard T. Boylan, 2005. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 7(2), pages 379-402.
- Smart, Susan R, 1994. "The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 301-323, Summer.
- Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 65-101, April.
- Formby, John P & Mishra, Banamber & Thistle, Paul D, 1995. "Public Utility Regulation and Bond Ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 119-136, July.
- Yeon-Koo Che, 1995.
"Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 378-397, Autumn.
- Che, Y.K., 1992. ""Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion," Working papers 9301, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Smith, Eric & Wright, Randall, 1992.
"Why Is Automobile Insurance in Philadelphia So Damn Expensive?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 756-772, September.
- Eric Smith & Randall Wright, 1991. "Why is automobile insurance in Philadelphia so damn expensive?," Staff Report 139, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Lee, Lung-Fei, 1983. "Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 507-512, March.
- Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-120, April.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
- Sam Peltzman, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003.
"Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
- Besley, Tim & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999.
"Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Susan R. Smart, 1994. "The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 301-323, June.
- David J. Salant, 1995. "Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 362-377, Autumn.
- repec:aei:rpbook:53308 is not listed on IDEAS
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- McShane, Michael K. & Cox, Larry A. & Butler, Richard J., 2010. "Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 522-532, March.
- Cole, John A. & Cadogan, Godfrey, 2014.
"Bankruptcy risk induced by career concerns of regulators,"
Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 259-271.
- Godfrey Charles-Cadogan & John A. Cole, 2013. "Bankruptcy Risk Induced by Career Concerns of Regulators," Papers 1312.7346, arXiv.org.
- Jill Bisco & Kathleen McCullough & Hugo Moises Montesinos Yufa & Eleanor Tice Sirmans, 2023. "The impact of monitor choice on insurer loss reserves," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 83-105, March.
- Martin F. Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, 2010. "Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property‐Liability Insurer Loss Reserve," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 21-49, March.
- Martha Henn McCormick, 2008. "Selected Research on Insurance Regulatory Reform: A Descriptive Bibliography," NFI Reports 2008-NFI-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute, revised Feb 2009.
- Alexander Whalley, 2013.
"Elected versus Appointed Policy Makers: Evidence from City Treasurers,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 39-81.
- Alexander Whalley, 2010. "Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers," NBER Working Papers 15643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2016.
"Regulations, institutions and income smoothing by managing technical reserves: International evidence from the insurance industry,"
Omega, Elsevier, vol. 59(PA), pages 113-129.
- Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2015. "Regulations, institutions and income smoothing by managing technical reserves: international evidence from the insurance industry," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 15/2015, Bank of Finland.
- Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2015. "Regulations, institutions and income smoothing by managing technical reserves: international evidence from the insurance industry," Research Discussion Papers 15/2015, Bank of Finland.
- Patricia Born & James Bradley Karl & Lawrence Powell, 2024. "The political economy of campaign contributions in insurance markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 41-55, April.
- Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2020. "Cross-country evidence on the relationship between regulations and the development of the life insurance sector," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 256-272.
- Jeungbo Shim, 2023. "Are mergers and acquisitions beneficial to consumers? Evidence from the property‐liability insurance industry," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 629-652, August.
- Pasiouras, Fotios & Gaganis, Chrysovalantis, 2013. "Regulations and soundness of insurance firms: International evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(5), pages 632-642.
- Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Liu, Liuling & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2015. "Regulations, profitability, and risk-adjusted returns of European insurers: An empirical investigation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 55-77.
- repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201508181354 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jeungbo Shim, 2017. "An Investigation Of Market Concentration And Financial Stability In Property–Liability Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 567-597, June.
- María Rubio-Misas, 2024. "Supervisory power and insurer financial stability: the role of institutional quality," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 49(4), pages 804-830, October.
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:2015_015 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201508181354 is not listed on IDEAS
- Leverty, J. Tyler & Grace, Martin F., 2018. "Do elections delay regulatory action?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 409-427.
- Mehmet I. Canayaz & Jose V. Martinez & Han N. Ozsoylev, 2015. "Is the revolving door of Washington a back door to excess corporate returns?," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1507, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Patricia Born & J. Bradley Karl & Charles Nyce, 2024. "Availability of the seat belt defense: Implications for auto liability insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 91(1), pages 193-212, March.
- Schlütter, Sebastian, 2011. "Capital requirements or pricing constraints? An economic analysis of measures for insurance regulation," ICIR Working Paper Series 03/11, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
- Jivas Chakravarthy & Katie E. McDermott & Roger M. White, 2021. "Are Regulators Effective at Unraveling Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from Public Utility Commissions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(7), pages 4532-4555, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2010.
"What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation,"
Working Papers ECARES
ECARES 2010-033, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Leverty, J. Tyler & Grace, Martin F., 2018. "Do elections delay regulatory action?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 409-427.
- Brezis, Elise S., 2017.
"Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 175-188.
- Elise S. Brezis, 2017. "Legal Conflicts of Interest of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2017-05, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
- Parinandi, Srinivas & Hitt, Matthew P., 2018. "How Politics Influences the Energy Pricing Decisions of Elected Public Utilities Commissioners," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 77-87.
- Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Galina Zudenkova, 2015. "Political cronyism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 473-492, March.
- Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2013.
"Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator’s Objective,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 563-594, August.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2011. "Investment, dynamic consistency and the sectoral regulator's obective," 8th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age 52341, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
- Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008.
"Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
- Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Fransesc Trillas, 2006. "Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation," School of Economics Discussion Papers 2006, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Duso, Tomaso & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2010. "The political economy of mobile telecommunications liberalization: Evidence from the OECD countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 199-216, June.
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
- Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013.
"Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
- Moita, Rodrigo M. & Paiva, Claudio, 2006. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," Insper Working Papers wpe_55, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
- Rodrigo Menon S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2006. "Political Price Cycles In Regulated Industries: Theory And Evidence," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 126, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003.
"Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
- Besley, Tim & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020.
"A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture,"
Working Papers
2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series 8968, CESifo.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2021. "A dynamic theory of regulatory capture," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2021/410, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Adam Fremeth & Guy Holburn & Pablo Spiller, 2014. "The impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 157-181, October.
- Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Microeconomics 0311002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tomaso Duso, 2005.
"Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 251-276, March.
- Tomaso Duso, 2001. "Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:1:p:116-133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.