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Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading

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  • Schwartz, Thomas

Abstract

In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning coalition prefers any other feasible outcome), it must be chosen in the absence of vote trading, although vote trading can (perversely) lead to a very different outcome. But vote trading does not necessarily lead to a “voting paradox” situation, contrary to several recent papers. The model enables us to define a natural solution concept for the case where every feasible outcome is dominated. Variations on this concept are explored. The effects of weakening the model are investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Schwartz, Thomas, 1977. "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 999-1010, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:03:p:999-1010_26
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James Enelow, 1986. "The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 285-294, January.
    2. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    3. Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2012. "Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 593-658.
    4. Thomas Schwartz, 1981. "The universal-instability theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 487-501, January.
    5. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
    6. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2013. "Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 737-756, June.
    7. Subochev, Andrey & Zakhlebin, Igor, 2014. "Alternative versions of the global competitive industrial performance ranking constructed by methods from social choice theory," MPRA Paper 67462, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 1985. "The politics of flatland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 45-60, January.
    9. Peter Bernholz, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 265-271, September.
    10. Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 197-214, July.
    11. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2016. "Matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts," Papers 1607.02378, arXiv.org.
    12. Joe Oppenheimer, 1979. "Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 419-434, September.
    13. Subochev, Andrey, 2008. "Dominant, weakly stable, uncovered sets: properties and extensions," MPRA Paper 53421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Jon X. Eguia, 2013. "The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 313-334, November.
    15. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.
    16. Zhijian Bai & Yang Zhang, 2021. "Sustainability of Ski Tourism in China: An Integrated Model of Skiing Tourists’ Willingness to Pay for Environmental Protection," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-16, August.
    17. Thomas Schwartz, 2021. "Parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 462-475, December.
    18. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    19. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    20. Bradley, W. James & Hodge, Jonathan K. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2005. "Separable discrete preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 335-353, May.
    21. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
    22. Khachaturyan, Arman, 2006. "The One-Share-One-Vote Controversy in the EU," ECMI Papers 1203, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    23. Subochev, Andrey & Aleskerov, Fuad & Pislyakov, Vladimir, 2018. "Ranking journals using social choice theory methods: A novel approach in bibliometrics," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 416-429.
    24. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
    25. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.

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