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A new old solution for weak tournaments

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  • Vincent Anesi

Abstract

This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of tournament games. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these “dynamic tournament games” yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments—the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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  • Vincent Anesi, 2012. "A new old solution for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:4:p:919-930
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0561-2
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    Cited by:

    1. , & , J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    2. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Vladimir V. Mazalov, 2020. "Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 119-145, March.
    3. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2014. "Two-party competition with persistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 64-91.
    4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2015. "Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 309-327, September.
    5. Vicki Knoblauch, 2020. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 369-381, October.
    6. Vincent Anesi & John Duggan, 2015. "Dynamic Bargaining and External Stability with Veto Players," Discussion Papers 2015-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John, 2017. "Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 30-40.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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