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Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)

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  • Noel Johnson
  • Courtney LaFountain
  • Steven Yamarik

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  • Noel Johnson & Courtney LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, 2011. "Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 377-393, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:377-393
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9634-5
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