Osiem pytań na temat korupcji
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
- Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2004. "The power of information : evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3239, The World Bank.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2004.
"The Economics of Repeated Extortion,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 203-223, Summer.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 1998. "The Economics of Repeated Extortion," CESifo Working Paper Series 172, CESifo.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The economics of repeated extortion," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Jakob Svensson, 2003.
"Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2486, The World Bank.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Seminar Papers 713, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 2003. "The Economics of School Choice," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number hox03-1.
- Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000.
"Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
- Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999.
"The Quality of Government,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, "undated". "The Quality of Government," Working Paper 19452, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Vishny, Robert & Shleifer, Andrei, 1999. "The quality of government," Scholarly Articles 30747160, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003.
"The new comparative economics,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
- Andrei Shleifer & Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez de Silanes, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm355, Yale School of Management.
- Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," NBER Working Papers 9608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3882, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez de Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3054, The World Bank.
- Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2002, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Scholarly Articles 28652214, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005.
"Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,"
Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472,
Elsevier.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," NBER Working Papers 10481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 4458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2004. "Institutions As The Fundamental Cause Of Long-Run Growth," Documentos CEDE 2889, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, "undated". "The Regulation of Entry," Working Paper 19462, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "The Regulation of Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 2953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andre Shleifer, 2000. "The Regulation of Entry," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1904, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei & Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, 2001. "The regulation of entry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2661, The World Bank.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "The Regulation of Entry," Working Paper Series rwp01-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "The Regulation of Entry," NBER Working Papers 7892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Djankov, S. & La Porta, R. & Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," Scholarly Articles 30747190, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- John Mcmillan & Pablo Zoido, 2004.
"How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 69-92, Fall.
- John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," Discussion Papers 03-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- McMillan, John & Zoido, Pablo, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," Research Papers 1851r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," CESifo Working Paper Series 1173, CESifo.
- McMillan, John & Zoido, Paolo, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," CEPR Discussion Papers 4361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998.
"Law and Finance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, "undated". "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1997. "Law And Finance," Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) Papers 294393, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Caroline Minter Hoxby, 2003.
"School Choice and School Productivity. Could School Choice Be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?,"
NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of School Choice, pages 287-342,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 2002. "School Choice and School Productivity (or Could School Choice be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?)," NBER Working Papers 8873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008.
"Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218,
Springer.
- Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-414, May.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991.
"The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
- Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," Working Papers 65, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," NBER Working Papers 3530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," Scholarly Articles 27692664, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001.
"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995.
"Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1, 25th A), pages 1-118.
- Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-292, April.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002.
"The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Besley, Timothy & Burgess, Robin, 2000. "The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2308, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Besley, Tim, 2001. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 2721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2004. "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 679-705.
- Helen F. Ladd, 2002. "School Vouchers: A Critical View," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 3-24, Fall.
- Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Do Institutions Cause Growth?,"
Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, September.
- Glaeser, Edward L. & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Scholarly Articles 27867242, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," NBER Working Papers 10568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutions and Economic Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 75-98, Winter.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
- Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003.
"Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
- Levitt, Steven D., 2002. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2wj7v1j4, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," NBER Working Papers 9413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
- Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
- Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dean Yang, 2005. "Integrity for Hire: An Analysis of a Widespread Program for Combating Customs Corruption," Working Papers 525, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002.
"Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December.
- Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2000. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," NBER Working Papers 7798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Derek Neal, 2002. "How Vouchers Could Change the Market for Education," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 25-44, Fall.
- Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
- Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 259-267, 04/05.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
- Krisztina Kis-Katos & Günther G. Schulze, 2013. "Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 27(1), pages 79-109, May.
- Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2008. "Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-26, CIRANO.
- Yan Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2012. "How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide," NBER Working Papers 17981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Maxime Delabarre, 2021. "Corruption and Development," Working Papers hal-03114382, HAL.
- Maxime Delabarre, 2021. "Corruption and Development," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03114382, HAL.
- Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016.
"The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research,"
Working Papers
908, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Roberto Burguet & Juan José Ganuza & José Garcia Montalvo, 2016. "The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research," Economics Working Papers 1525, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- De Rosa, Donato & Gooroochurn, Nishaal & Gorg, Holger, 2010.
"Corruption and productivity : firm-level evidence from the BEEPS survey,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5348, The World Bank.
- De Rosa, Donato & Gooroochurn, Nishaal & Görg, Holger, 2010. "Corruption and productivity firm-level evidence from the BEEPS survey," Kiel Working Papers 1632, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009.
"Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 88, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2009. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Post-Print hal-00725353, HAL.
- Fang, Hanming & Gu, Quanlin & Zhou, Li-An, 2019.
"The gradients of power: Evidence from the Chinese housing market,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 32-52.
- Hanming Fang & Quanlin Gu & Li-An Zhou, 2014. "The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market," NBER Working Papers 20317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clarke, George R. G. & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2004. "Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2067-2097, August.
- Börner, Kira & Hainz, Christa, 2004.
"The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Kira Boerner & Christa Hainz, 2004. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1293, CESifo.
- Boerner, Kira & Hainz, Christa, 2006. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 135, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Frank R. Gunter, 2013. "The Political Economy of Iraq," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14293.
- Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016.
"Corruption in Russia,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
- Guenther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2013. "Corruption in Russia," Discussion Paper Series 22, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Apr 2013.
- Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2016.
"Fiscal policy and corruption,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 57-79, January.
- Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2012. "Fiscal policy and corruption," Cahiers de recherche 12-09, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna, 2012.
"Corruption [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Hanna, Rema N. & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2012. "Corruption," Scholarly Articles 8830779, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2012. "Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp12-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2012. "Corruption," Working Papers id:4952, eSocialSciences.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 17968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2021. "What Determines the Return to Bribery? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6235-6265, October.
- Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
- Humna Ahsan & Keith Blackburn, 2015. "Human capital and income distribution in a model of corruption," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 208, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2008. "Bribe-Taking by Bureaucrats: Personal and Circumstantial Determinants," MPRA Paper 8668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2006:i:9:p:77-106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Grzegorz Konat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sgwawpl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.