IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v58y1998i2p211-215.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effects of campaign contribution sources on the congressional elections of 1996

Author

Listed:
  • Depken, Craig A.

Abstract

The debate over campaign-finance reform includes how different sources of campaign contributions affect the outcomes of political campaigns. Using data from the Congressional races of 1996, I find that PAC contributions had a larger effect on the percentage of votes received and campaign outcomes relative to individual and political party contributions. Incumbency advantage is negated after accounting for contributions to all candidates in a political race.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Depken, Craig A., 1998. "The effects of campaign contribution sources on the congressional elections of 1996," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 211-215, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:58:y:1998:i:2:p:211-215
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(97)00266-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1994. "Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 281-303, June.
    2. Scully, Gerald W, 1995. "Congressional Tenure: Myth and Reality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(3-4), pages 203-219, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cox, Christian, 2022. "Dark Money in Congressional House Elections," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    2. Noel Johnson & Courtney LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, 2011. "Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 377-393, June.
    3. Noel Johnson & William Ruger & Jason Sorens & Steven Yamarik, 2014. "Corruption, regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 51-69, February.
    4. Ching-Hsing Wang, 2022. "The Effect of Political Donation on Election Outcomes: Evidence from Taiwan Legislative Elections," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(1), pages 21582440221, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
    2. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Tangerås, Thomas, 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Seminar Papers 655, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    4. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
    5. María García-Vega & José Herce, 2011. "Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of public capital productivity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 75-92, January.
    6. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2017. "Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 501-524, September.
    7. Nichole Szembrot, 2017. "Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 25-41, October.
    8. Yasushi Asako, 2019. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 626-641, October.
    9. Rocío Albert & Francisco Cabrillo, 2006. "Gresham's law in politics: Why are politicians not the most remarkable men for probity and punctuality?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 99-112, April.
    10. Adam Meirowitz, 2005. "Informational Party Primaries and Strategic Ambiguity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 107-136, January.
    11. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:58:y:1998:i:2:p:211-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.