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Game of Regional Environmental Policy: Europe and US

Author

Listed:
  • Elias Asproudis

    (University of Swansea)

  • Nadeem Khan

    (University of Reading)

  • Nada Korac-Kakabadse

    (University of Reading)

Abstract

We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Elias Asproudis & Nadeem Khan & Nada Korac-Kakabadse, 2019. "Game of Regional Environmental Policy: Europe and US," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-20, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:19:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-018-0274-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-018-0274-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Peneder & Spyros Arvanitis & Christian Rammer & Tobias Stucki & Martin Wörter, 2022. "Policy instruments and self-reported impacts of the adoption of energy saving technologies in the DACH region," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 369-404, May.
    2. Elias Asproudis & Eleftherios Filippiadis, 2024. "Timing of Command-and-Control policy, asymmetric technology, and green trade unions," Working Papers 2024-04, Swansea University, School of Management.
    3. Buccella, Domenico & Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2021. "To abate, or not to abate? A strategic approach on green production in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Policy innovation; Timing; Transatlantic agreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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