Political Pressure Deflection
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Other versions of this item:
- James Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Political pressure deflection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 129-150, October.
- James E. Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Political Pressure Deflection," NBER Working Papers 10439, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anderson, J.E. & Zanardi, M., 2004. "Political Pressure Deflection," Other publications TiSEM 96f3a668-a4ae-419e-b276-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- JamesE. Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Political pressure deflection," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136351, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- James E. Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Political Pressure Deflection," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 594, Boston College Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009.
"Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
- Perroni, Carlo & Conconi, Paola, 2006. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5762, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2009. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/98549, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
- Tobias D. Ketterer, 2016.
"EU Anti-dumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?,"
The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 576-596, May.
- Tobias D. Ketterer, 2014. "EU Antidumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?," Discussion Papers 2014-05, University of Nottingham, GEP.
- Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2020.
"Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 93-117, January.
- Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2018. "Silent Promotion of Agendas: Campaign Contributions and Ideological Polarization," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 944, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 25 Jul 2018.
- Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
- Aquilante, Tommaso, 2015. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US," MPRA Paper 70359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
pressure deflection; elections; antidumping;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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